The Shakedown State:
The Mafia as Government in the Philippines
by Walden Bello
The last few weeks have been a veritable course in the realities of Philippine politics-even for Filipinos themselves. Ever since a close
political ally of President Joseph Estrada alleged a few weeks ago that he had delivered to the president 200 million pesos (about 197 million baht)
worth of the take from the illegal numbers game called "jueteng," the nation has been forced to absorb one lesson after another, most of them rather
One of the most important lessons was driven home to me by a friend from Colombia who has been been following the events unfolding in Manila. "In
Colombia, the mafia is stronger than the government," he told me. "But you know, we still are luckier than you Filipinos." When I asked why, he said,
"Because the mafia is the government in your country."
The great German sociologist Max Weber once defined the state as the institution that has a legitimate monopoly over the use of force. This definition
is inadequate when it comes to the Philippines, where the state maintains as well a monopoly or near monopoly over illegitimate services. Crime and corruption
are prominent features of governments the world over, but in the "normal" state, the sources of corruption are forces that subvert the machinery of government from without.
The mafia is not indigenous to the government; it corrupts and subverts public officials from the outside. In the Philippines, on the other hand, organized crime external
to the government apparatus has been rare. Of course, small-time crooks and gangsters have always existed outside officialdom. Syndicates are, however, another thing.
Syndicates—whether in gambling, drugs, or kidnapping—are unthinkable without the central organizing role played by government officials and politicians.
Even before the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos (1972-86), the pattern was for local or regional politicians to absorb petty criminals or toughs into
their warlord bands, to be used to muscle into, control, and expand lucrative sub rosa activities like illegal gambling, prostitution, or protection rackets, which served as
additional mechanisms to squeeze the economic surplus from the citizenry that could be deployed for increasingly expensive electoral struggles.
The reign of Ferdinand Marcos in the seventies and early eighties was another important step in the "mafiazation" of government. The loss of competitive politics at the national,
regional, and local levels led to the erosion of the already inadequate checks that the government machinery posed to regional and local political clans bent on expanding their access
to the social surplus via criminal methods. Marcos-linked political clans were able to bring to a new level—the provincial and in some cases the
regional—the organization and control of activities like jueteng, prostitution, and drugs.
Rise of the Syndicates
At the same time, the expansion and centralization of the central administrative machinery that marked the Marcos years opened up tremendous opportunities for economic mobility for
middle-class or lower-middle-class bureaucrats. With the traditional elite's maintaining its tight control over land and the private sector, the state became the choice arena for entrepreneurship
by restive and ambitious elements from the more modest classes. Syndicates or Sindicatos flourished not only in the traditional cesspools of corruption like the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
Department of Public Works and Highways but emerged as well in other agencies such as those on top of agrarian reform, energy, education, and natural resources.
The economic crisis that brought economic growth to virtually zero from 1983 to 1993 made government position even more attractive as a site of
private capital accumulation despite the personal probity of the top people in government like Presidents Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos. Indeed, it was under Aquino that a government reorganization was undertaken that,
unwittingly, created a massive new site of graft. The agency promoting the exploitation of the country's natural resources was joined to that responsible for protecting the environment to form the new Department of the
Environment and Natural Resources. The upshot was the creation of tremendous opportunities for moneymaking via the sale of environmental permits to loggers, mining firms, and other private sector entities that had
no intention of complying with environmental laws. Solidly entrenched, the mafia was able to thwart efforts at reform by progressive officials until, under the Estrada administration, it finally secured the top leadership
posts in the agency.
The Military Mafia
The consequences of the massive expansion of the security forces under Marcos were similarly explosive. Many in the uniformed elite either lent themselves out as enforcers for local or national cronies of the
dictator or carved out new illegal sources of income to supplement salaries that, more often than not, failed to match their new political role and status. By the end of the Marcos regime, not a few officers had discovered
that their command over men and firepower could be translated into successful entepreneurship in the form of kidnapping the rich-especially rich Chinese-for ransom. Why, they reasoned, should this extremely profitable
business be left to petty gangsters?
With the perquisites of command and payoffs from politicians diminishing after the "People Power Revolution" that dislodged Marcos and with the economic crisis deepening under the succeeding Aquino administration,
the organization of kidnappings moved higher and higher up the chain of command of the military and the police. Ordinary gangsters could never mount the sophisticated operations that involved getting inside knowledge of the net
worth of prospective targets from within the banking system. Indeed, when regular gangsters sought to organize independently of the military and police, they found out the hard way that the men in uniform would brook no
competition. Some observers contend that this was the significance of the total rubout of the upstart Kuratong Baleleng Gang a few years back, an operation carried out by security elites closely associated with then Vice
President Estrada, like Panfilo Lacson, now the country's top police officer.
From a sociological point of view, the most interesting item to come out of the revelations about the dividing up of the spoils of the jueteng gambling racket is that the main project of the Estrada administration was
to centralize crime under the presidency. Under Estrada, the most profitable criminal activities like jueteng were to be rationalized, with a sub rosa bureaucracy stretching from the president to the smallest jueteng
collector paralleling and intertwining at key points with the formal hierarchy of government. What was exposed in the jueteng scandal was probably only the tip of the iceberg. Were the worlds of prostitution, drugs, and
kidnapping also on the way to becoming equally centralized under Estrada? Many Filipinos are convinced they were, and are awaiting revelations about the drug-related financial take of the now-impeached president that might
surface during his trial in the Senate, which is scheduled to begin soon.
Had the Estrada project not been disrupted, the president would have become the apex of both the state and the underworld. This was the real "Estrada Revolution"-and we Filipinos had all thought the man was stupid! Removing
Estrada from office will probably be only the first step in decriminalizing the Philippine state. For what Filipinos are up against is a disease that is far advanced and in varying degrees of being insitutionalized centrally.
Which is why it is important that the next chief executive must be above suspicion when it comes to the question ties to the underworld. The main reason many people are apprehensive about Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
assuming office is that she is the godmother of the child of a man, Bong Pineda, who has been tagged one of the country's top illegal gambling lords. Ritual kinship bespeaks extremely close personal ties, and we Filipinos know
that we cannot kick out Estrada only to make way for somebody who might complete the mafiazation of the Philippine state.
Dr. Walden Bello is executive director of Focus on the Global South, a research, analysis, and advocacy program of the Chulalongkorn University
Social Research Institute, and professor of sociology and public administration at the University of the Philippines.